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This study focuses on the policy of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) launched in the chemical industry in 
the 1980s and known as “Responsible Care”. The debate surrounding this issue prompts us to question the ever-
changing nature of this policy and the way to measure the performance achieved.
Methodology
Our findings are drawn from analysis of a double set of data including a longitudinal survey and a current case 
study.  Blending these two data sets allows a better understanding of the ongoing building process of 
“Responsible Care” and, more broadly, of corporate social responsibility.
Findings
This paper asserts that, contrary to the common wisdom developed in research, companies do not simply react to 
stakeholder pressure. Companies autonomously develop ways to protect their environment and so contribute to 
changing Society’s expectations. Thus, performance cannot be read without a dynamic perspective in mind.
Research limitations/implications
Our findings lead us to reconsider the assessment of companies’ sustainable performances by taking into account 
the fabricating process of sustainable activities.
The main limitation of this research stems from the single unit of analysis considered. Broader studies will be 
necessary to enrich our understanding of corporate policies.
Originality/value of the paper
Our paper stands apart from the traditional view of organizations as cynical actors and attempts to provide a 
more complex picture of the behaviours observed.
Keywords:  “Responsible Care”, Corporate Social Responsibility, performance measurement, performance 
management, social context, interactionism.
1Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has become a concern that is increasingly displayed by 
organisations. However, this concern is not new and has already been the subject of numerous 
research papers (Loison and Pezet, 2006). Today, organisations should take into account – 
over and above their economic performances – their social and environmental performances. 
The modes of measuring and monitoring this broader performance have become more 
complicated and confusing as a result. Indeed, it is possible to doubt the sincerity of 
companies that voluntarily develop a CSR policy. The aim of this research paper is therefore 
to understand how such systems of monitoring and measuring performance emerge and 
function to respond to Society’s expectations. 
CSR brings us back to the classic question of the relationships between managerial practices 
and Society’s  expectations.  Stakeholder  Theory (Freeman,  1984) and Neo-institutional 
Theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Fligstein, 1990; Scott, 1995, 
2001) constitute the most commonly mobilised theoretical references for studying the 
influence of societal expectations on accounting and managerial practices. The rise of 
sociology in the field of accountancy (Hopwood, 1987; Miller, 1991) has also enabled us to 
better understand how Society and institutions influence accounting practices. Yet, this rise 
also requires us to study the way in which accounting practices in turn influence Society’s 
expectations. Consequently, our research sets out to understand how a practice of measuring 
and monitoring a CSR policy is institutionalised. 
To conduct this study, we focus on a policy of CSR launched by the chemical industry in the 
1980s known as “Responsible Care” (RC). This policy is noteworthy because it covers the 
chemical industry, one of the industries that concentrate heavily on CSR issues. It constitutes 
a policy of industry self-regulation, which has made it appear suspect in the eyes of many. 
This issue boils down to discussing performance, a social construct to be determined as a 
prerequisite to measurement. The debate surrounding CSR also prompts us to question the 
2nature – voluntary or constrained (i.e. under stakeholder pressure) – of policies that drive 
corporate managers to conserve natural and human resources. Our findings, drawn from 
analysis of a double set of both longitudinal and instantaneous data, show that reality draws 
from both voluntary and constrained policies. It appears that stakeholder pressures shape 
corporate practices but that, equally, corporate practices in turn alter Society’s expectations.
In the first section of this paper, we lay out the issues that underpin our research question. We 
then outline the genealogy of RC and describe one of its contemporary practices through a 
case study.
Literature Review on “Responsible Care”
RC is an emblematic policy of CSR. However, it raises questions as to how sustainable 
management works and how effective it is.
What is “Responsible Care”?
RC is an initiative developed by the chemical industry itself with the aim of regulating 
negative externalities caused by the profession. Companies from the sector are invited to 
comply with the policy in order to become members of the professional association. The 
policy hinges on ten guiding principles and six codes of management practices that break 
down into 106 management practices (Cherry and Weiler, 1998; King and Lenox, 2000).
Melnyk  et  al.  (2002) identify three features that characterise environmental management 
policies: the aim of the system set up (to handle problems or achieve results); the degree of 
focus on the environment; and the nature of verifying the results attained (internal or external 
assessment). It is possible to position RC with respect to these three dimensions. RC stems 
from a greater focus on processes and actions and characteristically involves focusing directly 
on the environment. Assessing results is internal to companies, a feature that correlates to the 
idea of self-regulation of the chemical industry. RC enacts an imperative for companies to 
focus on implementing means rather than achieving results. It does not specify a performance 
3level to be reached so as to accommodate the different situations of companies in the sector. 
Members move forward at the pace that suits them best and all that is required of them is to 
display continuous progress. RC is a flagship example of a self-regulation policy without 
sanctions (King and Lenox, 2000). However, according to Reish (1998), some leading 
companies in the sector deem that it has not been very successful and that sanctions may be 
needed to prevent free riding.
“Responsible Care” in the New Institutional Sociology (NIS) Perspective
RC has been mostly studied from the standpoint of neo-institutional theories. Two major 
theoretical issues have been discussed. The first covers the reasons that drive companies to 
develop such policies on a voluntary basis. On this point, the school of neo-institutional 
sociology provides analysis and deployable notions relating to the theme of CSR. For 
example, Hoffman (1999), adopting the framework outlined by Scott (2001), analysed the 
institutional factors that led the chemical industry, over a long period, to further integrate 
environmental concerns.
The second research question deals with the effectiveness of CSR policies that are voluntarily 
implemented by chemical companies. Few research papers have taken self-regulatory policies 
and their effectiveness as their theme. The main study covers the nuclear industry (Rees, 
1994). Contrary to what occurs in the nuclear industry, RC does not require a third party to 
monitor the performance of its members: that would limit its effectiveness. Sanctions 
associated with RC are fairly weak and consist essentially, and infrequently, in revoking the 
membership of the offending party. For supporters of this policy, it is deemed to enable the 
institutionalisation of best environmental practices. According to Gunningham (1995) and 
Rees (1997), self-regulation can shape behaviours. Coercion mechanisms are public exposure 
and shame, altering the preferences of actors (new norms), and even raising performance 
through learning and improving collective performance. These normative forces also change 
4preferences. As regards mimetic forces, they enable the diffusion of best practices and foster 
information sharing. The very fact of taking RC into consideration may already be changing 
practices. Thus, RC puts into play a set of isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) 
that gradually lead to a homogenisation and an institutionalisation of practices within the 
chemical industry. Companies that adopt RC consequently constitute an organisational field 
in the sense employed by Fligstein (1990), meaning a set of organisations seeking stability.
Critics of RC think, on the contrary, that it fosters free-riding phenomena because no formal 
sanctions are associated with it. For tenants of opportunism, RC serves as a smokescreen and 
fosters free-riding-type behaviours. RC practices may be adopted symbolically (Abrahamson 
and Rosenkopf, 1993; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991; Power, 1997). This being the 
case, some companies may still have an interest in adopting such policies even if free riding 
occurs.
“Responsible Care”: Beyond the NIS Perspective
NIS perspectives with regard to RC leave several questions unanswered. Firstly, does RC 
only constitute a symbolic discourse enabling the chemical industry to legitimise its activities 
or has it been truly integrated into the management systems of companies in the sector? 
Secondly, do companies need external pressure and a verification organisation to implement 
RC or could stakeholder pressure, or quite simply voluntary behaviour, suffice for such a 
system to work? Thirdly, is RC effective in reducing the environmental impact of externalities 
emanating from chemical companies?
It is our opinion that these issues cannot be fully studied without taking account of the process 
of institutionalisation – still in progress – of RC. It is then a matter of understanding how RC 
will become what it has yet to become (Burchell  et  al., 1980, 1985; Hopwood, 1987; 
Hopwood and Miller, 1994; Miller and O’Leary, 1987), namely analysing how we move from 
a set of hardly formalised, barely accepted, in short scarcely institutionalised practices, 
5towards practices with a significantly greater degree of acceptance. Previous studies have 
taken an interest in phenomena of institutionalisation of practices (Barley and Tolbert, 1997; 
Hasselblath and Kallinikos, 2000). Society does exert expectations on managerial practices, 
but little has been written about the origins of the solutions implemented by companies and 
the way in which these solutions continue to evolve. On the interactions between companies 
and stakeholders, which nonetheless constitute the very process of institutionalisation, current 
research remains equally silent. It is the whole of this phenomenon that underlies our research 
question: how are practices that are implemented in the framework of RC institutionalised 
within the chemical industry? 
Data Gathering and Methodology
To answer our research question, we gathered two types of empirical data. Firstly, we 
summarised the history of RC. This historical analysis, insufficient in itself, was then 
supplemented by a case study of contemporary practices in a chemical group.
According   to   Scandura   and   Williams   (2000),   field   studies   are   increasingly   used   in 
management research, especially field studies using secondary sources. Yet field study may 
also compromise triangulation, internal validity, external validity, and construct validity. Our 
double research strategy implements two levels of triangulation and thus raises the external 
validity of our research .
The First Data Stream
We first summarised the history of RC as it is presented on the Internet site of the Canadian 
Chemical Producers’ Association (CCPA
1). This story was drawn from the writing of J. 
Arthur O’Connor (a former board member of this association) about his personal experience, 
the archives of the CCPA and twenty hours of interviews with the main actors involved in this 
story. We selected excerpts that enable us to describe the genealogy of RC. These extracts are 
1 The CCPA (or ACFPC for Association Canadienne des Fabricants de Produits Chimiques) represents 70 
companies that are members and partners of Responsible Care, operating over 200 plants in Canada and 
responsible for over 90% of the national production of chemical products.
6clearly marked by a smaller font size in our text. We then triangulated this corpus of data 
using various documents covering RC (LaPlante, 1998; Prakash, 2000; Bélanger, 2005).
Firstly, we looked for Society’s influences on the diffusion of RC. In order to embody the 
various actors, we then drew up a list of the stakeholders (Freeman, 1984) present in our two 
case data sets. Post, Preston and Sachs (2002) identify ten categories of stakeholders. From 
the data gathered, we finally retained the following categories: the chemical industry, 
governments and regulatory authorities, professional associations, the press and media, 
associations   and   NGOs,   local   communities   and   citizens,   public   opinion,   investors 
(shareowners and lenders), employees, trade unions, customers and users, and suppliers.
Subsequently, we identified the way industrial groups have acted autonomously to enable the 
idea of environmental management to move forward on its own accord. The final phase of 
creating an explanation is enactment: creating a story. With this goal in mind, we made a 
presentation of our story using verbatim quotations and critical examples.
The Second Data Stream
Our choice of case study is both theoretical and opportunistic (Yin, 1994). Choosing Rhodia 
is firstly justified by its numerous citations in the press for good results with respect to the 
environment
2. However, this company was also chosen because we had been conducting a 
previous study there for four years. This study led us to gather, indirectly, much information 
on RC. During informal discussions, the actors we encountered talked about RC both 
frequently and spontaneously. 
By analysing these initial data, we were able to contact the company’s actors knowing exactly 
what we wanted to validate. The researcher then returned to the field equipped with a grid for 
semi-directive   theoretical   interviews.   Three   managers   (head   office,   functional   and 
operational) were questioned about their experiences and practices with regard to RC. One of 
2 For example, the press release from Vigeo, a CSR rating agency in France on 6th June 2006, and the Global 
Reporters-PNUE study in 2005.
7the persons interviewed was a former trade union representative who had developed his vision 
of RC as a union representative and subsequently as a manager. These interviews were 
supplemented with document analysis (internal reports and the Internet site).
Finally, three series of information were available for our study. Firstly, there was information 
gathered during the previous study. The interest of this information essentially relates to its 
reliability because it was gathered from actors observed with respect to another, more 
financial, problematic. Secondly, there was information of a factual nature regarding the 
company’s practices (for instance, spreadsheet models or reporting procedures). Thirdly, there 
were the actors’ stories, anecdotes and critical incidents with respect to RC practices. Our 
study shows that the latter data are by far the most interesting for our problematic since they 
generate new ideas (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Using these elements, a descriptive case study was written by the researcher once the data had 
been gathered and submitted to each of the persons encountered at Rhodia for validation.
The Genealogy and Current Practices of “Responsible Care”
The Genealogy of “Responsible Care”
RC is a CCPA-instigated initiative. This policy was first developed in Canada before 
spreading in the second half of the 1980s, firstly across the United States, then into Europe 
and finally worldwide.




Influence of pressure groups: governments and other groups.
1977 Creation of a work group for controlling industrial risks in the chemical industry within the 
CCPA following requests for information from the government and the general public.
1978 Approval by the CCPA governing board of the idea for guidelines.
1981 Presentation by Dow Chemical of Canada of its concept of “responsible care” to the media, then 
to the CCPA governing board. This report was reused four years later.
1981-83 Limited diffusion of the guidelines (with only one in three members complying with them) 
Companies fearful of lawsuits.
1983 The guidelines took on greater scope and all members comply with them. 
11/ 1984 The Bhopal Disaster: demand for information from the authorities, media and general public.
81984 Implementation of a safety policy following Bhopal.
The guidelines became mandatory for all members of the association.




The Sarnia Incident: the creature from the black lagoon (the blob).
Intervention by Greenpeace and the media.
Relaunch of the cross-referenced audit processes and reminder of the conditions for membership 
to the association.
Late 1985 Political agitation, risk of legislative attack, “crisis of confidence in the population”.
Early 
1986
Start of a policy of “quick victories” to bring about the adhesion of members and of the general 
public. 
Creation of a code of awareness based on the model of the Chemical Manufacturers’ Association 
(CMA) in the USA. 
Late 1986 Approval of the first code of practice.
Policy of openness and dialogue: positive reaction from the media and the general public.
1986 Development of a link between the Brundtland Report and Responsible Care following an 
individual initiative by a Dow manager, development of the social and societal aspects.
1986 Creation of an external assessment panel composed of stakeholders.
1988 Implementation of RC in the USA.
11/1988 Approval and appropriation of the codes of practice.
1986-90 Harmonisation of the guidelines and the codes of practice.
1990-92 Application of the codes of practice (deadline: 1992).
Perceived risk “that postponing the deadline [would] entail a loss of credibility and a tightening 
of regulation”. 
1993 The process of public verification was initiated.
1994 CCPA published A Primer on Responsible Care and Sustainable Development in which it tried to 
describe both the cohesion of SD and RC topics and, equally, the grey areas where the scope of 
sustainable development clearly extended beyond RC.
The genealogy of RC shows that the development of this policy was an initiative proposed by 
several companies, then expanded to cover the whole industry in the guise of responding to 
stakeholder pressure. An interaction mechanism was gradually put in place to change the 
practices and expectations of the different actors.
The process has taken almost two decades. There was no strategic plan. There was no grand design any 
more than there can be a grand design for the ever-changing expectations of society […] Each new 
phase was triggered by an event or conditions stemming from the external environment and at each new 
step there was a belief that what was being done was the right thing. (O’Connor)
A Private Initiative
RC first appeared as an internal concern in several companies that subsequently attempted to 
recommend it to the industry as best practice. Although pressure – notably from the 
9government – was exerted, it was not considerable, at least at the beginning of the process, 
and it cannot explain the genesis of practices that seemed to be primarily private initiatives.
The roots stretch back to Canada in the late 1970s. In 1977, the CCPA set up a working group 
for managing industrial risks in the chemical industry to contain the environmental impact 
caused by its production operations. There was also a need to respond to requests from the 
Canadian   government   and   the   general   public,   which   were   scrutinising   the   safety   of 
transporting chemical products.
The driving forces at the time were that governments and others were beginning to raise questions about 
the health effects and safety of chemicals. The sensitivity was focused mainly around transportation. 
(O’Connor)
In that period, pressures to regulate the chemical industry were building up and were particularly 
exacerbated by the major derailment of a hazardous-material train in late 1979 that resulted in the 
evacuation of Canada’s fifth largest city. (Bélanger, 2005)
The   group   drew   up   recommendations   that   went   beyond   the   simple   framework   of 
transportation and which the group suggested formalising in the form of recommended 
guidelines. It also suggested that membership of the CCPA be conditioned by compliance 
with these guidelines. The organisation therefore moved towards modes of self-control by the 
profession itself. In May 1978, the recommendations were approved by the CCPA but only 
one third of member companies signed the protocol. Yet, on the sidelines, the guiding 
principles enabling reasonable management were being improved upon in certain companies. 
It was these private Canadian initiatives that would finally take centre stage at the beginning 
of 1980s.
In October of 1981, Boldt, vice-president of Dow Chemical of Canada, presented the concept of 
Responsible Care to the board as part of the TMC's work plan for the coming year. He was chairman of 
the committee at the time. As Boldt puts it, "Either they didn't understand it or I didn't describe it well, 
but the program was not approved. Probably because it meant a change in the way management had 
historically managed."
However, the association did make use of the guiding principles as appendices to various submissions to 
government but there was no formal document per se which could be used to give public exposure to 
them. It's fair to say that the principles did not receive much, if any, public exposure at the membership 
level. It was known at the time that the legal advice provided to some of the members raised the spectre of 
potential liability associated with these statements. (O’Connor)
It therefore appears clear that there was resistance from the companies to its widespread 
adoption based on the fear of litigation or of wrongful use of any information provided. 
10Perhaps some actors – notably the weakest companies – also feared losing their rank in the 
face of this strengthening of competition, although no current data allows us to assert any 
such ulterior motive. The guiding principles of RC, which aim to steer the means to 
implement – in line with a logic of continuous progress – rather than the results to achieve, 
would actually plead in favour of the absence of any ulterior motive to regulate competition.
The issue was then sidelined until 1983, if we are to believe the minutes taken at CCPA board 
meetings. For the first time, the guiding principles took on an official dimension and all 
members were to comply. The general framework of RC was thus in place, but at that time 
nothing obliged the companies to go beyond their simple commitment to the guiding 
principles and to implement genuine practices of responsible care.  
The fact that the members accepted what was considered premature three or four years earlier is a clear 
indication of an overall shift in attitude. This was all before the industry's feet were put to the fire by 
Bhopal. The mind-set was beginning to form and there was a commitment to the guiding principles and a 
Responsible Care framework already existed. However, it still took the right ingredients to apply the 
resources and will to build on that framework. (O’Connor)
A Widespread Adoption under Pressure from Public Opinion
Developing the implementation of guiding principles for RC accelerated from 1984 onwards. 
Indeed, it was at this time that the “unthinkable” happened: the Bhopal disaster. The 
explosion of a  Methyl Isocyanate  storage tank on the site of the American multinational 
Union Carbide located in Bhopal (India) released a toxic cloud resulting in the poisoning of 
thousands of victims. The widespread adoption of RC was consequently the fruit of pressure 
from government, media, public opinion, local communities and citizens.
The first response of the CCPA was to set up systematic self-assessment practices for the 
risks involved. A task force was in charge of developing a method of verifying safety, 
applicable to both chemical plants and their relations with local communities. 
This task force under Finn Hoveland of DuPont subsequently produced a document titled Safety 
Assessment Process which had two components: internal programs dealing with the plant and external 
programs for outside the plant fence. […]  The external programs component  gave rise to the 
development of the community awareness and emergency response program which was formally 
activated on June 4, 1986. (O’Connor)
11These verification procedures encountered implementation problems in certain companies 
notably due to issues relating to the confidentiality of production techniques and liability. 
Thus, although certain companies were truly committed to the process in that period of time, 
others   still   attempted   to   delay   or   limit   its   adoption,   despite   growing   pressure   from 
stakeholders following Bhopal.
One board member stated emphatically that he did not want anyone from outside his company going 
through his plants […] The tough part for the members was that, for the first time, they were going to 
have to report to the association on matters related to their internal practices. This marked a quantum 
change in the role of the association and one which gave a great deal of heartburn to the members. Much 
of the concern stemmed from the potential liability attached to the information. (O’Connor)
But a series of accidents drove companies to move towards greater transparency and not 
simply make do with the technical management of safety issues. It was a question of opening 
up to the outside world. Canadian business leaders then shifted from a “private” safety policy 
to a public policy that clearly disclosed the issues at stake. 
In the summer of 1985 Sarnia experienced its own version of the "creature from the black lagoon" in the 
form of "the blob". An accidental release of perchlorethylene into the St. Clair River caught the attention 
of Greenpeace during its annual visit to the Great Lakes. "The public was saying to us, 'not only do we 
not know what's going on, but we're scared to death about the involuntary risk you create for us in your 
plants and in the chemicals you sell and handle. And, by the way, it really is an invisible industry because 
we don't know how we benefit from these damn things and yet there are risks for us... and you're not 
telling us what you already know’." […] "The industry was becoming visible, but for all the wrong 
reasons." (O’Connor)
These accidents did not leave the government ambivalent, and ecologist groups and the media 
began to react. The chemical industry went through a real crisis of confidence in a context in 
which, more broadly, the environment constituted one of the main public concerns. 
As a result, the approaches initiated several years earlier were given a concrete and official 
point of application. Yet, contrary to the stance adopted by the Americans after Bhopal, the 
Canadian response to this disaster was more oriented towards managing industrial risks than 
managing public opinion. From 1986 onwards, to the technical dimensions of RC were added 
the guiding principles and an ethic underpinning the whole device.
After approving the codes of practices, the association implicated its members in a policy of 
openness and dialogue with the general public and local communities, entailing a positive 
12reaction from the media and public opinion. In addition, a panel of independent members was 
set up to provide an outside point of view. This panel exerted its influence at the level of the 
professional organisation rather than at the individual company level. 
The panel was seen originally as a source of informed opinion on potential or emerging public concerns 
over health and environment. As part of that process it was expected that it would advise the association 
members on their practices and the appropriate changes that might be made to them. It was never used 
as a means to influence the attitudes of panel members or the environmental community. […] Its 
members were selected based on their areas of interest and not because they belonged to any particular 
interest group. (O’Connor)
Convinced that the local community was entitled to know the risks to which it was exposed, 
the panel proposed a policy on the community’s right to know. Finally, under its influence, 
the association developed a set of protocols to follow whenever the commitment of a member 
was called into question.
An International Extension of the Industry’s Initiative 
Over time, the initiative – still exclusively Canadian in 1985 – was diffused on an 
international level. From the local, the solution became global. Yet again, the initiative came 
from the American industry, undoubtedly driven by strong mimetism.
Responsible Care was never envisioned as an international movement. It just happened. There is no 
doubt in anyone's mind that if it had not been for the U.S. involvement it would never have expanded at 
the rate it did, if at all. (O’Connor)
The empirical elements presented here illustrate the interactions that exist between the 
company   and   Society   within   the   framework   of   developing   a   device   for   sustainable 
management. The data gathered suggest that these interactions are not one-way – from 
stakeholders  to companies  – but that companies  also  contribute to moving  Society’s 
expectations forward as a whole.  Beyond companies, stakeholders are consequently relays 
for these concerns and contribute to modifying corporate practices. The Canadian panel set up 
to monitor RC, for instance, played a proactive role in developing practices. These practices 
therefore appear to be rather more a co-construction between company and Society than a 
response from companies to stimuli. Do we uncover these same reciprocal Society-corporate 
practice influences when we examine the contemporary case of a company applying RC?
13CSR and “Responsible Care” at Rhodia
Following this longitudinal analysis of the origins of RC, we propose in this section to study 
how a company applies RC. We should assess the way in which actors use this management 
policy if we are to uncover the behaviours of actors as described in the historical section.
The monitoring of RC policy at Rhodia is performed using three main instruments that are 
totally integrated into the group’s own management system: audits, performance indicators, 
and a policy of transparency and dialogue.
Audits enable the company to establish a diagnostic of the situation and notably to identify 
points   for   improvement   for   each   of   the   entities   audited.   The   company   ensures   the 
exhaustiveness of this analysis by conducting three types of complementary on-site audits. 
“System” audits are performed by the group every three years. Through this audit, the 
variance that exists between the reality and the benchmark is measured. Action plans and 
correction actions are then launched and are subject to monitoring quarterly by the members 
of the site’s management. Field-based audits aim to verify in the field the right appropriation 
of the CSR philosophy by operational managers. Members of management verify best 
practices and deploy the right words rather than sanctions. Finally, there exist equipment 
audits. The choice of points to audit is made by operational managers and validated by the 
safety department. These audits are supervised by senior managers. This is an opportunity to 
initiate the sharing of best practices, to help those who encounter difficulties and to invest in 
improving key factors.
These audits do not enable the company to reach preset goals but, instead, to progress 
continuously in improving its environmental and social performance. Indeed, the results 
achieved sometimes go beyond the expectations of stakeholders who are not always aware of 
the technical possibilities provided by this approach to continuous progress.
14Different performance indicators enable the company to measure the effort made with regard 
to   RC.   Defining   these   indicators   is   largely   based   on   the   1998   reporting   guidelines 
recommended by the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) and the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) for chemical companies. To monitor indicators, reporting tools have been 
created. Consequently, a “RC Statement” is available on the group’s Intranet and accessible to 
all personnel. Certain RC indicators are also subject to monthly release in the form of a letter 
for the three levels group/companies/entities. A worldwide version of the set of indicators is 
also drawn up annually in both computer-generated format and in the form of a sustainable 
development report. In light of pressure from the authorities, the media, public opinion and 
the growing expectations of the set of stakeholders, these documents constitute tools for 
Rhodia to communicate with its stakeholders. These indicators have been integrated for 
several years, enabling notable trends to be measured. It is quite common for the indicators to 
record values that are well below legal requirements. In this case, the legal norm and the 
demands of stakeholders tend to fall in line with the company’s performance over time.
The case of Legionnaires’ disease
To control Legionnaires’ disease, the Rhodia group set a frequency of counts in its cooling towers: 
twelve counts must be performed every year. It was a question of moving away from an obligation to 
achieve results (an indicator displaying an absence of Legionnaires’ bacteria) towards an obligation to 
establish and maintain control where fluctuations are allowed within authorised limits. This is why the 
number of measurements has been increased in order to measure the phenomenon more frequently, to 
avoid being taken by surprise, and to be able to plan corrective action. Every year, an inquiry is 
conducted into this aspect. The figures are communicated to the Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable 
Development regardless of whether they are good or bad. The goal is to create trust with the governing 
body by being transparent. This then enables us to manage crises better. 
Rhodia’s practices may then be taken on board by the Regional bodies governing Industry, Research and 
the Environment (DRIRE - Directions Régionales de l'Industrie, de la Recherche et de l'Environnement), 
which adapts its by-laws as a result. This is also explained by the presence of Rhodia employees in the 
various national bodies. Whenever demanding, high-performance tools are developed internally, it is 
gratifying to see them receive recognition afterwards. This is why the Ministry of Ecology will soon 
require twelve annual counts of legionnaires’ bacteria with regard to water-cooling towers.
Reporting the indicators retained poses a number of difficulties. The first difficulty arises 
from the heterogeneity and the subjectivity that characterise the defining and measuring of 
indicators: they damage the comparability of the results and the value of the information 
gathered. The second problem stems from the difficulty in valorising certain phenomena due 
15to their environmental and social nature. These difficulties in measuring results explain why 
industrial actors focus their attention rather more on the positive dynamic of actions 
undertaken than on hypothetical results.
The case of controlling work-place accidents
Work-place accidents are typical of the constraints that a manager encounters. Generally, a manager 
seeks to avoid any deaths or serious accidents. The law encourages him to act as such because his legal 
liability is most often implicated. To avoid an accident occurring, he must monitor both work-place 
accidents and also incidents that, alone, are events the frequency of which may serve as an alarm bell. 
The Bird Pyramid, a concept developed in 1969 in the United States, shows that there is a statistical 
relationship between incidents, accidents according to their degree of gravity, and work-place deaths. 
Yet, defining a work-place accident, and a fortiori an incident, is a sensitive task. It depends on the 
gravity but also on simply recognising it, which depends on a statement “negotiated” by the accident 
victim, his boss, the work-place medic, and other members of the personnel… Some accident victims are 
sometimes temporarily moved to specially adapted positions, enabling the company to avoid declaring 
accidents. This pressure may emanate from management but also from colleagues who subsequently 
punish “back stabbers”, even from the individual himself who may be worried about avoiding problems 
or keeping his “virility”. Shifts in the number of incidents or minor accidents must therefore be treated 
with care. If a manager reacts too suddenly to a rise in incidents (a precursor to further slippage), for 
example by putting pressure on his subordinates, he runs the risk of reaching his goals: the incidents will 
drop, but only because they will simply be covered up. Behind the figures, therefore, there are behaviours 
to manage. On the issue of measuring performances and monitoring, of reporting information by 
workshop, the pressure on operational managers must be adapted to facilitate their work so that they do 
not cover up the reality and, in particular, to help them to implement solutions.
Finally, certain results may sometimes appear disconcerting and incite individuals not to 
communicate them. Indeed, for certain types of indicators, the more it measures, the more the 
indicator worsens, when progress may actually have been made. It is not uncommon to see 
indicators rise simply because the fact of measuring them has enabled new sources of 
emissions to be identified.
The case of VOC emissions
Counting emissions of certain pollutants must sometimes be handled with care. For instance, with regard 
to VOC (volatile organic compounds), measuring these products when they are channelled is relatively 
easy. In contrast, it is more complicated for the same products when they are released in diffused or 
fleeting emissions. Indeed, the more we seek to measure, the more we find emissions and the more the 
indicator worsens, whereas progress may actually have been made. 
This ambiguity in measuring results may explain conflicts and debates between stakeholders 
and companies. Integrating stakeholders into the process of continuous progress serves 
precisely the purpose of eliminating this difficulty in measuring results. As well as audits and 
indicators, Rhodia relies on a policy of transparency and dialogue to limit the risk of conflict 
within the framework of RC. The industrial site studied has been conducting consultations 
16with the local community panel for a long time, which constitute opportunities to discuss air 
and water emissions, noise pollution, etc. In some cases, several months are required to solve 
problems,  something  that local residents  sometimes  find hard  to accept.  To  improve 
understanding, dialogue and explanation are needed.
The case of the plant’s ventilators
One of the issues dealt with was the silencing of noise caused by one of the plant’s ventilators. Managers 
went into local residences to identify the source of the problem. They invested a lot of their time 
identifying the problem. The noise was actually audible from the housing estate, but not from inside the 
plant, which initially defied understanding. Identifying the problem therefore had to involve visiting local 
residents to make them aware of the plant’s good will towards them. Once the cause was pinpointed, an 
investment of €57,000 was made over several months.
However, this dialogue also contributes to modifying stakeholders’ perceptions. Certain 
elements become acceptable in the view of certain stakeholders who may integrate the 
company’s constraints. Occasionally, diverging viewpoints between stakeholders appear and 
lead to radical change in the perceptions of all the actors. Moreover, corporate practices may, 
to a certain degree, be said to make the very demands of Society possible. Studying the 
complex nature of these reciprocal relationships between the company and Society is the 
subject of our third section.
The Reciprocal Influence Company Practices-Society
In this section, we show that the development of RC cannot be analysed solely as an influence 
exerted by Society upon corporate practices, but that management practices are equally 
constitutive of the expectations of Society and thus create feedback loops of recursive 
influence. Rather than only considering the institutional influence exerted on a management 
practice, we contribute here to illustrating the process of institutionalisation of a practice as a 
blend of practices and pressures.
RC practices have significantly progressed and continue to develop further. The system is 
therefore not institutionalised but still going through a phase of institutionalisation, meaning 
of construction. Despite numerous discourses surrounding chemical managerial practices, we 
17can observe the existence of real CSR practices in the chemical industry. However, the 
question of the effectiveness of these practices still remains.
The genealogy of RC policy clearly shows that the origins of the process stem from a blend of 
political pressure, professional initiatives and companies that go beyond a simple response to 
political pressure from the Canadian government. There are manifestly some stakeholders 
who develop initiatives for improving plant safety and do not systematically require external 
pressures. We should also note the absence of certain stakeholders that either do not intervene 
in our case studies or do not have the means to express their views. The influence of one 
stakeholder may equally vary over time and space. Thus, in the genealogy of RC, companies 
have sometimes accelerated the process due to their initiatives and to the development of RC 
principles and practices internally, but have also sometimes slowed down, even stonewalled, 
the process when they felt threatened by the programme (notably with regard to disclosing 
information and risking liability). Likewise, depending on the period of time and geographical 
zone, local residents of chemical plants may adopt a very critical, even protesting, stance 
towards the industry or, on the contrary, accept to collaborate with plants in order to find 
shared solutions to the problems raised by the chemical activity. Finally, stakeholders may 
equally be influenced by corporate practices.
RC is therefore not simply a response to pressures from stakeholders who mostly express their 
opinions well after the first initiatives undertaken by the profession itself. Even though the 
chemical industry has taken on board pressure from stakeholders, it has often been one step 
ahead and in fact continues to be so today. For example, regulations (e.g. REACH) may 
constitute a major factor of innovation with respect to the monitoring and steering instruments 
of RC policies for companies. The search for new tools to comply with legislation sometimes 
leads companies to develop new cutting-edge practices internally that will, in turn, be 
assimilated by regulatory bodies and reintegrated into legislation as the case of Rhodia’s 
18Legionnaires’ disease procedure shows. The institutionalisation of RC therefore arises 
through the active contribution of companies and may even be reinvigorated by the activities 
of some. 
Similarly, in the framework of Rhodia’s policy of transparency and dialogue, the local 
community panel enables the local population to express their  expectations, share in 
discussing issues relating to the plant and participate in resolving them in partnership with the 
plant’s management. Beyond problem solving, such structures for sharing also constitute, in 
return, a means for the company to share its own constraints with local residents. In this way, 
certain elements become acceptable to stakeholders. Exchanges between the company and its 
stakeholders, whether they are belligerent or not, may thus lead to a shift in the perceptions of 
all actors in relation to the problem or conflict initially addressed.
In this type of practice we can detect phenomena of reciprocal interaction between the 
company and Society. On the one side, the demands of Society with regard to protecting the 
environment and occupational health and safety are imposed as constraints on the company. 
Reciprocally, the company, in its drive to adapt (reactive behaviour) and in its drive to 
innovate (proactive behaviour), contributes to changing Society’s expectations on these issues 
by proposing new practices and enriching thinking on CSR with its successes and its internal 
performances. The genealogy of RC portrayed here shows that, on several occasions, the 
industry positioned itself in anticipation of stakeholder expectations and that it has widely 
fostered and participated in gradually increasing collective awareness of the need for this 
policy. The example of RC shows, in both its historical dimension and its contemporary 
application, that the industry isn’t limited to satisfying stakeholder demands but provides 
itself with the means of going beyond them and, in certain cases, even moving them forward. 
The process of institutionalisation therefore cannot be boiled down to a simple unilateral 
influence of Society on managerial practices.  It is sometimes  the corporate practices 
19themselves that make the demands of Society possible. The Society-management practice 
relationship may therefore be defined as a feedback loop.
Conclusion
Studying RC shows the validity of referring to neo-institutional theory within the framework 
of the problematic of CSR in the management sciences. Nonetheless, failing to take into 
account the influence of management practices on changes in Society only leads to a partial 
analysis of company-Society relationships. Neo-institutional theory does not allow us to study 
these relationships in their entirety, hence the need to supplement it with other theoretical 
elements dealing with factors governing the emergence and development of CSR policies. A 
longitudinal   approach   based   on   the  idea   that   management   practices   are   born   out  of 
institutional pressures but sometimes pre-date these pressures and may even participate in 
certain changes in Society, proves to be richer. Building a renewed theoretical framework that 
provides a new approach to CSR is needed.
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